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The implementation of the Integrated Product Team (IPT) concept by the
Department of Defense to support the acquisition process assumes that service
members and DoD civilians work together productively to produce effective
weapon systems. This thesis investigates military-civilian relationship issues on
IPTs.
Interviews were conducted with twenty-three DoD civilians and service
members who have participated in Department of Defense IPTs. These interviews
were consolidated and issues shared by a majority of the interviewees are
presented and analyzed in terms of the existing literature on inter-group conflict.
All interviewees stated that these group stereotypes had no negative impact on IPT
performance.
Conclusions reached were that military and civilians do have positive and
negative perceptions regarding the other group, and based on existing literature,
these issues present challenges for the two groups to work together productively
when both participate in IPTs. Models from the research literature on intergroup
conflict are used to provide recommendations for addressing intergroup
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The exploration of military and civilian relationships as they impact
Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) was chosen for a study topic for the following
reasons. Most important, the Integrated Product Team concept is pertinent to the
current Army Acquisition environment. As the defense budget shrinks, the
Services must find more efficient ways to develop and procure weapon systems.
Industry is using the IPT concept to improve the way they do business; the
Department of Defense acknowledges this success and has adapted the concept for
their use. The success of these multi-functional teams requires the involvement
and effective integration of all players, both military and civilian personnel.
As a DoD civilian with experience in Program Management (PM) offices
and a Program Executive Office (PEO), the researcher has witnessed interactions
between military and civilian personnel. This first-hand experience prompted
further exploration of how these two groups interact in an IPT environment, the
existence of possible inter-group biases between the groups, and the effect any
differences have on IPT performance.
A. BACKGROUND
The Secretary of Defense directed the Services to implement the Integrated
Product Team concept in May 1995 (Perry, 1995). DoD Directive 5000.1 and
Regulation 5000.2-R (1996), reflect that direction by stating that the Department
perform as many acquisition functions as possible using IPTs. The Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (1996) defines an IPT
as representatives of appropriate functional disciplines working together with a
team leader to build successful and balanced programs, identify and resolve issues,
and make sound and timely recommendations to facilitate decision making.
The Department has directed that IPTs function in a spirit of teamwork with
participants authorized and empowered (to the maximum extent possible) to make
commitments for the organization or functional area they represent (DoD Directive
5000.1, 1996). This Department of Defense regulation states that the IPT concept
must stress the following principles:
• Open, qualified discussions, with no secrets
• Qualified, empowered team members
• Continuous, "up-the-line" communications
• Consistent, success oriented, participation
• Reasoned disagreement
• Issues raised and resolved
In order to facilitate the IPT concept, team members must view each other
as valuable contributors to the process, each with an equal voice in the group. The
IPT concept may require team members to change the way DoD acquisition
business has been done in the past as the military environment may not view all
members as equals. An example of this is civilians stating that they are treated as
second class citizens (Broedling, 1979; Wermuth, 1979; and Woolley).
This thesis will focus on the relationship of the principal members of the
Army Acquisition Corps' IPTs: military officers and Department of Defense
(DoD) civilians. These two employee groups are expected to work harmoniously
and productively in IPTs although they come from different professional cultures.
These different professional backgrounds create a possibility for conflict and
tension in an IPT. The groups may also have biases and negative stereotypes
about each other which could aggravate any existing conflict and tension. Prior to
their Acquisition Corps experience, these two groups have worked together
infrequently and know little about how the other group operates (Skinner, 1991).
This lack of direct experience can lead to a greater reliance on stereotypes that can
interfere with productive interaction (Amir, 1979).
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
This thesis will provide a qualitative analysis of possible inter-group biases
on Integrated Product Teams in the Department of Defense. It describes
experiences of DoD civilians and military officers while they served on IPTs that
were composed of civilians and military officers. The results provide insight for
people involved in IPTs and identify what influence military or civilian bias may
have on team performance.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
What are the attitudes and assumptions that military officers and
DoD civilians, who have served on Acquisition Corps IPTs, have towards each
other and how can those attitudes affect team performance?
2. Subsidiary Research Questions
a. What does the existing literature say about the perceptions
that DoD civilians and military officers have towards each other?
b. What do current IPT members state about the assumptions
and attitudes that Acquisition Corps military officers and DoD civilians have
towards each other?
c. Given the research results, what can be predicted about the
success of the two groups working together in IPTs?
d. Given the research, how can diversity be managed to ensure
team success?
D. SCOPE
This paper focuses on the use of employees with different professional and
cultural backgrounds in Integrated Product Teams. It reviews existing research
and conducts new investigations of the assumptions and attitudes that each group
has towards each other. Existing research is used as a basis for further
investigation. The results of the new research are analyzed and further hypotheses
generated regarding the likely influence of these attitudes on the effectiveness of
IPTs. In addition, the literature is reviewed for suggestions to support these two
different groups working together more successfully in IPTs.
E. METHODOLOGY
The literature is reviewed to investigate the affect cultural differences and
inter-group biases have on teams and whether team members' attitudes and
assumptions about each other affect team performance. Existing research is
reviewed and new research is conducted to determine what attitudes and
assumptions the groups have towards each other. The data received from the
research questions are qualitative. They are derived from interviews with both
military and civilian personnel who have direct experience working with IPTs.
F. LIMITATIONS
This study does not review the use of TQM theory or if IPTs should be
used. It does not review the structure or organization of the Acquisition Corps or a
Project Manager's office.
A limitation of the research is the use of a small sample size. The small
sample of 23 interview subjects was required due to intensive methodology of in-
depth interviews and time constraints for research completion. This may limit
generalizability to Department of Defense acquisition organizations that employ
IPTs due to the limited number of interviews conducted.
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
This thesis is divided into six chapters beginning with Chapter I which
provides an introduction to the subject, a justification for the research, and a
discussion of research questions and organization of the thesis. Chapter II
contains a review of existing literature on cultural biases and their impact on team
success, characteristics of successful teams, team conflict, team conflict
management and attitudes of DoD civilians and military officers towards each
other. Chapter III details the selection of the research strategy, choice of personnel
to be interviewed, data gathering methodology and the approach to data reduction
on research results. Chapter IV describes research results from the interviews,
including lessons learned. Chapter V discusses what issues emerge from the
interviews in terms of the literature reviewed on attitudes of military and civilian
personnel towards the other group and the characteristics of effective teams.
Chapter VI develops conclusions and recommendations for future study.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The purpose of this section is to provide a brief introduction to the affect of
cultural diversity on team success, team management and the Federal Government,
characteristics of effective teams, group conflict, conflict management and existing
research on civilian and military employees related to this thesis research. A
literature search was conducted through the Defense Logistics Studies Information
Exchange (DLSIE), the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) and the
library at the Naval Postgraduate School to enlighten the author on the topics
noted above.
A. CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND TEAM SUCCESS
During a literature review of cultural diversity, the author found that
successful private sector companies are well represented in the literature. There
are numerous descriptions of the affect of cultural differences on organizations
with conclusions that cultural differences need to be recognized to achieve success
(Bartunek, 1996; Harris, 1987; Sackman, 1991; Schneider, 1996; Schreiber, 1996).
Cultural literature addresses the great opportunities which are presented by the
diversity of members of different cultures. These advantages include greater
potential and creativity from the synergy of the workforce, recapturing
commitment and releasing unused talent (Jaminson and O'Mara, 1991).
Managers can no longer assume that all employees have the same cultural
perspective or that employees with different cultural backgrounds can be forced to
fit into a standard corporate mold, where white males comprise the dominant
majority. By the year 2000, the minority share of the workforce will grow to 25
percent (from 17 percent in the late 1980s), women will comprise 50 percent of the
workforce and 30 percent of the workforce will be over 45 years old (versus an
average age of 28 in 1970) (Jamenson and O'Mara, 1991). With these changes in
the workforce, organizations must realize that employees cannot be stereotyped
but must recognize and work with these diverse groups.
Diverse groups have been shown to make higher quality decisions, due to
the group's ability to think in more realistic and complex ways about its choices
and the group's ability to relate better to its customers (Milliken, 1996; Schneider,
1996). Diverse groups have also been shown to benefit from the communications
that take place with non-group members whom the group may depend on for
resources, information and acceptance (Milliken, 1996). The willingness of
outsiders to accept and provide information to the group may depend on the
outsider believing that their views are represented within the group; a diverse
workgroup is more likely to, at least, recognize that "outsider's" viewpoint
(Milliken, 1996).
An organization's beliefs, attitudes, procedures, practices and priorities are
reflected in the way the team itself functions (Harris and Moran, 1987). The
literature emphasizes that, in order to gain the potential benefits of team
management theory, cultural differences must be addressed (Bartunek, 1996;
Schneider, 1996; Schreiber, 1996). If an organization has an indifferent and
unaccepting attitude towards sub-group cultures, it is not recognizing the potential
contributions of all members in the workforce and it is not using all the talent and
resources available.
B. TEAM MANAGEMENT AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Total Quality Management has been shown to increase organizational
productivity and quality, help organizations accomplish their goals more
efficiently and improve performance through the use of teams. The benefits the
commercial sector has gained from Total Quality Management and the use of
teams has been recognized by the Federal Government and is seen as a necessary
ingredient if the Federal Government is to reinvent itself and improve the way it
provides services to the taxpayer. This recognition is found in numerous
references, including the Vice President's National Performance Review (Gore,
1993). This document recommends that the Government's efforts be customer
focused and strive towards continuous improvement of products and services
provided to the public.
Team management theory must be utilized if the Government wants to
implement and succeed as a Total Quality Management organization (Cohen,
1993; Fargher, 1992; Federal Quality Institute, 1994). The Federal Quality
Management Institute, in their review of eight Federal organizations that won the
President's Award for Quality, noted that all of the organizations utilized team
management to align efforts in support of the customer. For example, the Air
Force's 653rd Communications-Computer Systems group used cross-functional
teams to analyze operating processes. They placed a high premium on teamwork
and cross-training to facilitate each team member's understanding of the
requirements of the others in the group; these teams enabled the members to work
together and use group problem solving tools (Federal Quality Management
Handbook, 1994).
The San Francisco Region of the Wage and Hour Division, Department of
Labor, found that the use of self-managed teams was effective in addressing areas
of widespread violations in specific industries or localities. When the region
changed its focus from enforcement to compliance, it involved all employees in
planning. As a result of this change, two thirds of the work of the staff is now
carried out by self-directed teams. As noted by the Federal Quality Institute, the
use of teams and the associated empowerment of employees has contributed to the
success of every organization cited in the 1994 report.
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Another source of Government TQM success stories is the Report on
Productivity and Quality Improvement in Government (1991). This document
highlights the successful use of teams in support of Total Quality Management.
One organization cited in the report is the Department of the Navy Office of
Civilian Personnel Management, who initiated a long-term project to incorporate
quality principles in all aspects of their operations. An important aspect of their
implementation effort was the use of teams to identify quality improvements and
create or revise services.
The 1991 report also cited the Naval Ship Weapon Systems Engineering
Station as a TQM success story. As part of their implementation of TQM, they
established a team-oriented process improvement and problem-solving
methodology. This involved all employees and emphasized behaviors and
approaches to business and management practices which support teamwork. The
team approach was applied in an engineering and scientific environment, which
was a unique application of total quality principles, as total quality had previously
been focused on manufacturing and production processes.
As these Government organizations' experiences illustrate, Total Quality
Management and the use of teams improves processes and products. These
organizations have shown that a management style of working as individuals does
not have as great an impact on quality improvement as self directed teams.
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The IPT concept capitalizes on attributes of the TQM concept and extends
the emphasis on quality via the implementation of integrated teams. Dr. Paul
Kaminski, the Under Ssecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
(1995) stated that the IPT concept works with the strengths of all participants in
the acquisition process to develop programs with the highest opportunity for
success and creates teams out of historically adversarial relationships between
headquarters and program offices. Dr. Kaminski also emphasized the importance
of working as a cross-functional team to maximize overall performance.
The Department of Defense has based its implementation of IPTs on the Air
Force's success with the process at the Air Force Materiel Command in 1992.
This organization implemented a new acquisition management philosophy
combining the development and logistics elements and allowing for a cradle to
grave systems management concept. The process made the program director the
focal point for the customer by increasing the director's authority and flexibility
over the program, integrating all of the acquisition processes and eliminating the
gaps that existed between development and support elements (Przemineniecki,
1993). Based on this success, the Department of Defense incorporated the concept
into their acquisition procedures.
Despite the successes shown by the commercial sector, no research was
found by the author which documented Government improvements gained with the
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use of the IPT process. Although DoD has little experience with IPTs, and the
research is limited in documenting its successful implementation, the Department
of Defense is emphasizing wide use of the approach in its acquisition affairs,
based on the success shown in the commercial sector.
C. EFFECTIVE TEAMS
The Government has directed that the Defense Acquisition community
utilize teams to the maximum extent. The successful implementation of IPTs
depends on the effective functioning of the teams formed to support this initiative.
Katzenbach and Smith (1991) discuss the components of effective teams.
The authors state that effective teams encourage listening and constructive
response to views expressed by other team members, provide support, give others
the benefit of the doubt, and recognize the interests and achievements of others.
Teams have shared leadership roles, individual and mutual accountability,
collective work products; discuss, decide and perform real work together; and hold
open-ended discussions and problem solving meetings. Good teams also have
specific team purposes that the team itself delivers and measures performance by
assessing collective work products.
The research states that the essence of a team is common commitment.
Without common commitment, groups do not perform as teams but as individuals;
with common commitment, individuals use collective performance to work as a
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strong team. These authors state that strong teams should determine how
schedules will be set and adhered to.
The authors state that team members should possess good problem solving
and decision making skills and technical or functional expertise. Team members
also require good interpersonal skills include risk-taking, helpful criticism,
objectivity, active listening, giving the benefit of the doubt and recognizing the
interests and achievements of others. Mutual understanding, discovery and
understanding of how to apply all its human resources to a common purpose are
issues which should be addressed and implemented in an effective team. The
authors also state that the team should spend time together to create a personal
bond and give the group time to learn to be a team.
D. INTER-GROUP CONFLICT
Service members and Department of Defense civilians work together on
teams, however, these groups may hold biases towards the other group (i.e.,
civilians may have biases regarding service members; service members may have
biases about civilians). Each group may identify with their own professional
group (i.e. "in-group") and have biases about the other professional group (i.e.,
"out-group"). Biases that a group holds about an out-group may cause conflict
that may interfere with team performance.
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Research on inter-group conflict has been presented by Stephan and
Stephan (1985) which shows that inter-group conflict may be produced by
interactions with out-group members, whether or not the two groups have had
previous contact. Conflict may be caused by feared negative consequences:
• feelings of embarrassment, incompetence, confusion and frustration
due to their own group's behavior or the other group's behavior
• exploitation or domination of individual by other group
• disapproval and rejection by members of the other group (out-group
members will see you as inferior)
• disapproval and rejection by members of the individual's group (in-
group will disapprove of the person's relationship with out-group)
These feared negative consequences may result in the following behaviors:
• avoidance of the other group
• hesitation and withdrawal from interaction with the other group
• out-group members are blamed for poor performance and any
positive behavior may be disregarded
• self-esteem is threatened
• exaggerate positive or negative interactions (positive experience will
seem very good, negative experience will look very bad)
Brown (1983) states that too much conflict produces strong negative
feelings, blindness to interdependencies and uncontrolled escalation of aggressive
action and counteraction. Conflict between two individuals may be due to
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personal feelings, job differences, group membership, or all three. Managers may
assume that conflict is due to the individuals involved, implying that the problem
can be solved by replacing the individual. If the conflict is the result of group
membership (e.g., military or civilian), the pressures of in-group identification and
out-group bias may have an impact within and between the groups involved. If
conflict between the groups escalate, this may encourage a view of "us versus
them" and negative stereotypes, increasing the emphasis of differences, resulting
in decreased or distorted communications.
Brown adds that the introduction of power differences to intergroup
relations further suppresses communications between the groups. The low power
group is vulnerable to the high power group, and may censor communication to
that group. The high power group may remain ignorant of information considered
sensitive and withheld by the other group. The long term result may be mutually
reinforced fear and ignorance and may escalate to intense and sporadic fighting.
Brown states that the importance of conflict resolution skills is increasing
due to our increasingly interdependent and heterogeneous world. The chances for
conflict is increasing rapidly and management of conflict among groups is
important to organizational survival.
Jehn (1995) states that conflict may cause an individual to experience
frustration, strain and uneasiness in the group experience and result in
psychological or physical withdrawal from the group. People who feel friction
with each other or experience personality clashes work less effectively, produce
sub-optimal products and may lose perspective about the task being performed. In
addition, groups that experience conflict may spend time trying to resolve, ignore
or discuss the conflict instead of dedicating time to the task to be performed.
E. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
As stated above, Brown (1983) argues that conflict management is a crucial
skill for those who lead modern organizations. Conflict is common in
organizations and should be managed, but often goes unrecognized. Too much or
too little conflict may be detrimental to an organization.
Conflict may be due to organizational differences (e.g., engineering versus
production) power differences (due to one's placement in the organization) or
societal history (racial differences, religious groups). To address conflict, Brown
suggests diagnosing the conflict. Brown's diagnosis technique includes the
examination of attitudes, behaviors and structures.
Attitudes are defined as the orientation of groups and group members to
their own and other groups. This tells the extent to which groups (and their
members) are aware of group interdependences, the group knowledge about
intergroup relations, and feelings and stereotypes within groups. Too much
conflict may mean blindness to interdependences and the cost of conflict, as well
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as strong negative feelings and stereotypes. Too little conflict may mean the group
is blind to conflicts of interest, the cost of collusion, and is unaware of group
differences.
Brown's diagnosis continues with the examination of cohesion and
conformity by group members and the presence and level of intergroup conflict or
cooperation. Excessive conflict results in overly competitive actions and
increasing aggression among groups. Insufficient conflict means undefined or
fragmented groups and extreme cooperative actions instead of the examination of
differences.
Brown concludes his diagnosis technique with an examination of structures
which influence interactions in the long run: larger systems that individuals belong
to, structural mechanisms which connect the parties, group boundaries and long
term interests. Too much conflict means a lack of techniques to link the groups,
clearly defined and conflicting group interests, and few rules to limit conflict. Too
little conflict is encouraged by a shared larger system which suppresses the
conflict, few mechanisms to examine differences, vague definitions of conflicting
group interests and identities and regulations that discourage conflict.
Brown suggests moderate conflict is desired for team effectiveness. This
level of conflict is associated with a high degree of energy and information
exchange. While too much conflict may be counter-productive and too little
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conflict may inhibit communications, a reasonable degree of conflict, appropriate
to the group and its task, is desirable.
Cox (1991) lists numerous techniques to reduce conflict and bias in groups:
training and orientation, insuring minority group acceptance, new member
orientation, career development, revamping reward systems to reinforce conflict
and diversity management, mentoring, social events, and bias reduction training.
Messick and Mackie (1989) cite methods to improve intergroup relations.
These include increased interpersonal contacts between the groups, change
directed by law or regulation (e.g., anti-discrimination laws), conflict resolution,
bargaining and negotiation, changing the out-group stereotype through direct
contact, and aUminishing the intensity of in-group identification. The authors
added that direct interpersonal contact helps reduce negativity.
Amir (1969) endorses the benefits of individual exposure to other groups to
change individuals' beliefs towards each other. Additionally, Amir states that
institutional support (e.g., equal employment initiatives) helps to increase
understanding between groups by reinforcing social desirability of interaction.
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F. MILITARY AND CIVILIAN RELATIONSHIPS
While the literature cites many instances of team success and the necessary
recognition and inclusion of different cultures to ensure success of the team, the
literature does not specifically address the effect of integrating the two major
cultures present in the Department of Defense that work on IPTs: military and
civilian cultures. Although the literature does not cite instances and effects of
military and civilian relationships on Integrated Product Teams, it does address the
general relationship between these two groups.
Broedling (1979) examined the relationship between military and civilians
via interviews, observations and questionnaires for the Naval Personnel Research
and Development Center. The study researched the nature of the civilian
executive jobs, including the military-civilian executive interface. The research
found that civilian executives interacted closely with military executives and all of
the interviewees stated that the military-civilian interface was important to the
effective functioning of the Navy. All civilians interviewed felt the fact that their
jobs are embedded in a military system has implications for their duties. In
addition to interviews, this study reports a questionnaire in which military and
civilians were asked to rate a series of questions on a scale of zero (not at all true)
to seven (very true). When asked if there is a productive partnership between
military and civilian executives in commands where they work together, the
20
civilian executives responded with an average score of 5.3 (standard deviation
(SD) = 1.3) while the military executives had a mean score of 6.3 (SD = 1.0).
When asked if civilian executives in the shore establishment are often treated as
"second class citizens," civilian executives responded with a mean score of 4.3
(SD = 1.9) and military executives responded with a score of 2.8 (SD = 1.5). The
results show that civilians were not as positive as the military in rating the
productive partnership between the two groups. In addition, civilians see
themselves as second class citizens while the military do not perceive that civilians
are treated in this way. These findings were statistically significant (p < .05),
which indicates a high amount of discrepancy between their attitudes toward each
other and their relationship. The study noted that the civilian-military relationship
should be improved.
Young's (1985) research cites that the two groups in the civilian-military
relationship are significantly different in many ways and this helps to explain
different perspectives on certain issues. These differences include the wearing of
the uniform, the salute, the caste-like system of officers and enlisted personnel,
military quarters which are separated from the civilian element, and the transient
nature of the military. Young stated that the two groups need to not let these
differences interfere with the need for these groups to cooperate and produce in a
working relationship. A relationship that has been nurtured through emphasis on
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common bonds (with the recognition of differences) can provide a leader with the
support necessary to implement a difficult decision.
Skinner (1993) focused on Total Army Culture and the importance of
civilians to the team effort. Skinner states that some Army civilians were not
accepted as an essential part of the team. He based this statement on results of
surveys which identified military and civilian perceptions regarding the other
group, value differences, and systemic differences between the military and
civilian personnel management systems as factors that have a negative impact on
Total Army Culture. Skinner also states that the cultural gap between civilian and
military cultures needs to be bridged in order to create a Total Army Culture.
Skinner states that the military does not understand the civilian workforce
and the civilian workforce does not fully understand the customs, traditions and
operations of the Army. He suggests a better integration of the civilian and
military members of the Total Army into a uniform corporate culture is required to
improve the performance of the organization. Skinner states that the two
subcultures did not share the same core values and the underlying systemic causes
create a separation between military and civilian subcultures. These systemic
problems include an ineffective and complex personnel management system; poor
communications; apathy among military leaders; failure of the system to support
the employee, manager or Army mission accomplishment; and the failure of Army
22
leaders to provide effective leadership to Army civilians. The result of the
separation between the subcultures are civilians who neither feel, nor are accepted,
as an essential part of the Total Army Team.
Wermuth (1979) suggests that no future system intending to use more
civilians will be successful unless attitudes and practices tending to impose second
class citizenship on civilians in the military establishment are eliminated.
Wermuth states that, as a uniformed military officer, he had greatly overrated his
knowledge of Army civilians and that broader research is required to reduce
misunderstandings that exist in military-civilian organizations.
Long (1977) found that close military contact with civilians improves
officers' attitudes towards civilians. Officers surveyed state that civilians are not
willing to work more than 40 hours per week in order to do a good job and
perceived that civil service employees wait out the transfer of an officer to avoid
doing something with which they disagree.
Bridger (1994) states that mixing the civilian and military systems
frequently leads to misunderstandings with members of both sides feeling
unappreciated. This is illustrated by civilian employees who state that service
members 1) would be happier without civilians, 2) have no knowledge of civilian
personnel rules and 3) simply dictate to their civilian employees because they are
the boss. Military officers are often frustrated with civilian employee management
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due to the rules which dictate civilian personnel policy, including the civilian use
of compensatory time and overtime which service members do not receive. The
gap between service members and civilians is marked by perceptions that the two
groups hold about each other. Service members perceive that civilians must, at
times, be motivated to perform and are less responsive to and feel less respect for
service members, but add that civilians are needed for their institutional
knowledge. Civilians may assume that a service member knows nothing about the
management and rating of civilians (Bridger, 1994). An American Federation of
Government Employees official stated that:
Many officers have no knowledge of the civilian sector and they
don't bother finding out the personnel rules. They just
dictate...that's the way it is because I am the boss. Sometimes
captains and lieutenants don't understand why they can't order a
civilian around like they can a private." (Bridger, 1994, p. 14)
The author notes that as we become more interdependent and as the Services open
more opportunities to civilians that were traditionally held by military, it is
necessary that civilians and military work more closely together.
Woolley, et al (1986) conducted research to formulate a strategic plan to
guide future research on the Army's civilian personnel workforce. The goal of this
research was to provide a framework for developing a knowledge base which
could lead to improved management of the civilian personnel workforce. Sixty-
five Army officers and civilians were interviewed and asked to offer suggestions
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about significant issues which would warrant future research. The results showed
that the effectiveness of the military-civilian relationship was an issue requiring
further research. The two groups expressed concern over many aspects of the
relationship. For example, civilian respondents reported feeling like second class
citizens in the Army structure. This perception was validated by military
respondents to the study. In addition, the majority of respondents to the study
emphasized the difference between the military and civilian occupational cultures
in that a military officer can see a direct link between training and promotion while
civilians see little relationship. Study participants acknowledged that military are
ill-informed about the complexities of the civilian personnel system and critical of
those parts of it which seem to interfere with their ability to manage their
workforce.
Each group was critical of the other group's knowledge and experience
supervising their group. Civilians criticized military concentration on cash awards
as the sole method to recognize civilian achievement while alternate means of
recognition are available. Service memebers criticized civilian concentration on
time: "We [the military] have to stay and you guys [civilians] get to go home"
(Woolley, etal,1986, p. 79).
A strategy suggested by the study would involve the transition of
knowledge about each culture to members in the other culture. Both cultures
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would systematically acquire knowledge about the other culture as part of their
professional training. The study found that research should be designed to
systematically ascertain differences in value systems between the military and
civilian subcultures and ways in which the two cultures are detrimental to a
climate of respect.
Apple states in his 1973 thesis that the potential for conflict between
military personnel and civil servants at the working level is a constant threat to the
Air Force manager. The Department of Defense faces many situations that are not
normally encountered in civilian organizations; personnel problems arise from the
fact that the Department of Defense combines two distinct career services, the
professional military and civil servants. Factors that degrade the relationship
between the two groups would also tend to degrade the overall management
function. Apple argues that a major factor which degrades the relationship is the
separate and distinct personnel system that governs and provides a source of
conflict for both groups.
Markessini, Lucas and Chandler (1994), conducted research to improve the
development of senior and strategic leaders in the Army. They found that seventy-
four percent of participants cited problems with the interface between uniformed
and civilian executive leaders. However, there was a lack of consensus on the role
of education and training as a means to address this problem. The study
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participants felt that there was a need to improve the relationships between
military and civilian leaders, as noted by 20 of the 27 respondents (all senior
executive civilian service members).
One civilian participant in the study stated that "When we go to pick
Colonel program managers, we cannot find any who are competent. It is a
desperate situation." (Broedling, 1979, p. 51). Another participant viewed the
problems of the military-civilian interface as insoluble, stating:
I have come to believe that military officers simply do not care about
civilians. While they are stationed here, they are out to get whatever
they can from the civilians, whatever provides them with the best
image and career possibilities. No training will change that.
(Broedling, 1979, p. 51)
The study findings showed that the jobs of many in the Army's executive and
senior executive services are difficult and this difficulty is enhanced by an
inequitable distribution of the educational and developmental benefits that would
enhance their capabilities and thus facilitate performance.
These research efforts show that differences between the two groups do
exist. One difference noted by the research is the civilian tendency to build a
consensus and avoid risk taking. As noted, these differences can be attributed to
many factors: experience, education, personnel and reward systems and cultural
influences. Although these differences may be known by members of both groups,
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more may need to be done to improve the relationship between the groups in order
to successfully implement integrated product teams.
G. SUMMARY
In summary, the commercial sector has found success with the
implementation of Total Quality Management and Integrated Product Teams.
Along with the use of the team management concept, commercial organizations
have discovered that the incorporation and acceptance of different cultures into the
team management strategy benefits the organization.
The Department of Defense has also adopted a Total Quality Management
philosophy and the Integrated Product Team concept. As the commercial sector
has done, the Department of Defense must incorporate all of its "cultures,"
including military officers and civilian employees. If the Department of Defense
is committed to IPTs and Total Quality Management, it must acknowledge the
factors that have contributed to the success experienced by commercial companies.
Furthermore, it must incorporate those factors into the team philosophy it will put
into place. A major factor of the demonstrated commercial success is the
incorporation of different cultures into the team. In order to best utilize the
resources available to it, each organization must recognize and work with the
groups that will make up its integrated product teams.
Successful teams are comprised of team members who can work together
towards a common goal. In order to facilitate the interaction of the group, the
group must have good interpersonal skills and recognize that all members of the
team have something to contribute. Group interaction and communication may not
be as effective if conflict exists in the group and may cause an individual to
experience frustration, strain and uneasiness in the group causing the group to
work less effectively. Conflict can be reduced by numerous methods, including
increased interpersonal contact between the groups, institutional and legislative
change (e.g., equal employment laws) and conflict resolution.
Research completed to date states that there are differences between the
military and civilian cultures, and, at times, these cultures clash. Successful team
efforts employed by the commercial sector recognize and work with the
differences that exist. Although many military officers and civilian employees
realize that there are differences between the two groups, little has been done to
ensure these differences do not interfere with the relationship between the two
groups and that these two groups work well together. Successful groups that
depend on shared purpose, free and open communication and empowerment need
to recognize and use all team members. As stated in existing research, conflict
may result if group members do not have mutual respect for each other, and this




A. OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH
This thesis explores how military and civilian relationships impact
Integrated Product Teams, now that the Acquisition community has been directed
to use teams to facilitate the acquisition process. It also investigates how
experienced IPT participants view the relationship between the two groups and
what affect differences between the groups may have on teams.
B. GENERAL RESEARCH STRATEGY
A comprehensive review of open literature on teaming and the affect of
cultural differences on teams was conducted. In addition, Department of Defense
information resources were studied to learn of existing research regarding civilian
and military relationships.
This literature review was followed by telephonic and face-to-face
interviews with Integrated Product Team participants. In this study, team members
included service members and civilians who have participated in or managed IPTs.
Questions used during the interviews were designed to solicit responses
which would answer the primary and subsidiary research questions presented in
Chapter I. All interviews were recorded on audio tape, then transcribed and
complied into cumulative response lists which allowed the data to be categorized
and analyzed.
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C. CONDUCTING THE RESEARCH
1. Interview Participants
Participants were solicited based on their experience with Integrated
Product Teams. Military and civilian employees who have worked on IPTs or
managed IPTs were used as interview subjects. These IPT participants work in
various levels of the Defense Department, including Department of the Army Staff
employees, Army Program Executive Office employees and Army Program
Management employees. Interview subjects range from civilian grade GS 13 to
SES and military officer rank 03 to 08. In addition to interviewing employees with
experience on IPTs, the researcher wanted to ensure that a cross-section of
interviews was conducted to minimize bias. To support this, the researcher
interviewed eleven civilians and twelve service members from twenty Department
of Defense organizations.
2. Collecting the Data
The critical incident interview technique was used to gather data to support
this research. Flanagan (1954) describes the technique as a procedure to collect
data regarding direct observations of human behavior and using the collected data
to solve particular problems. In order to collect the required data, the interview
subject is asked to relate observed specific behaviors, called incidents. The author
states that "the use of the critical incident technique, rather than simply collecting
opinions, hunches and estimates, provides a record of specific behaviors from
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those in the best position to make evaluations." (Flanagan, (1954, p. 17) The
incidents described are then used to gather important facts concerning behavior in
defined situations. This technique was chosen based on the potentially sensitive
subject matter discussed in this research and the desire to avoid a simple collection
of opinions.
Interviews with participants were conducted to gather data describing
specific instances that illustrate the military-civilian relationship and how that
relationship impacts the functioning of the IPT. The following interview questions
were used in both the face-to-face and telephonic interviews. The questions
presented to the interview subjects were designed to collect data pertaining to the
participants' experience on an Integrated Product Team, what interactions they
witnessed between the groups and the biases and stereotypes which may effect
how the two groups work together.
1. Describe a time when anlntegrated Product (or process) team,
composed of military and civilian members, worked well.
• How would you describe the relationship and interaction between
group members?
• What roles did group members assume? Did civilian and military
members assume different/similar roles?
• Did the group receive training on IPTs? Did this training help
foster group effectiveness? If training was not provided, would
training have helped the group?
• How was team leadership addressed by the group? Was a leader
assigned by management or did the group pick its own leader?
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• Did other individuals assume leadership roles - regardless of an
assigned leader? What impact did the leader have on team
effectiveness, particularly military-civilian interactions?
• Did the Chain of Command have an impact on the team's
effectiveness?
• Did the two groups have mutual respect towards each other? Did
the groups listen and discuss viewpoints of all team members?
How did the group evolve over time?
• If conflict arose, how was it managed by the group? How were
rough spots overcome? Were there particular types of conflicts
that reflected particular perspectives unique to military and
civilian members of the team?
• Were there differences in work styles that could be attributed
to differences in how military and civilian members viewed
the work of the team? Appropriate processes? Level of
effort? Team processes?
2. Describe a time when military/civilian IPT did not work well
together.
• What were the interactions of the team members?
• Was conflict a factor in the lack of success in the group? What
characterized the conflict with others? What specific issues
could be attributed to a military versus civilian perspective? Was
the conflict overcome? If so, how?
• Did the members show respect towards each other? Could a lack
of respect have contributed towards the poor working
relationship?
• What are the nature of biases that individuals have towards the
other group that may interfere with team effectiveness? Could
individual biases towards the "other" group members have
contributed towards the lack of team success?
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• Could assumptions/biases of the group members had a
negative impact on team effectiveness?
• How did management influence the group interaction?
• What other factors (outside of those already discussed)
contributed to the group not working well.
3. Biases and stereotypes towards the other group.
• What biases exist that could affect how military and civilian
IPTs function?
• What do military officers (or civilian employees) see as the
cultural differences between the two groups? Do these
differences impact team success?
• Do stereotypes exist that inhibit team success?
• Can you share any experiences that display the existence of
biases and stereotypes?
a) How Interviews Were Conducted ?
For all interviews, the list of interview questions was provided to the
interview subject well in advance of the scheduled interview. Before conducting
the interview, interview subjects were informed of the purpose of the interview
and advised that no individual would be identified in the thesis. The author
determined that anonymous interviews would result in a more candid disclosure of
information on this potentially sensitive subject. This condition of anonymity was
reinforced during the interview session by informing the interview subject that no
participant would be identified in the research. Voice recording of the interviews
allowed greater accuracy and interpretation of the responses and expedited the
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interview process. The use of a recorder also enabled the researcher to keep the
interview in focus and ensure each session was a valuable use of the interview
subject's time. Interviews took between one to two and one-half hours to conduct,
averaging one and one half hours.
The researcher maintained a separate response form for each
interview which included all required administrative information (name,
organization, e-mail address, date of interview, etc.) on interview subjects. All
administrative forms were cross-referenced to the corresponding audio tape,
transcript, and notes of the interview.
b) Analyzing the Findings
Upon completion of interviews, the researcher transcribed the data
captured into written text and consolidated the data into a main interview sheet to
categorize the type of interview (military, civilian, team member, leader or
manager). This enabled further analysis of the data gathered from the interviews.
The interviews were then sorted into military and civilian responses according to
the issues addressed. These groups were then subcategorized into the following
areas:
Military biases and stereotypes towards civilians
Military opinions on civilian stereotypes towards service
members
Civilian biases and stereotypes towards service members
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• Civilian opinions on service member stereotypes towards
civilians
Once the interview responses were categorized, major themes
identified by the critical incidents or elaborated discussion were noted and are
included in the analysis section.
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IV. RESEARCH DATA PRESENTATION
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents data gathered through interviews with Acquisition
Corps personnel who have participated in IPTs. Twelve service members and
eleven civilians were interviewed for this research. The people interviewed are
not identified by name or professional association for the sake of anonymity.
Section B of this chapter identifies service members' concerns regarding the
working relationship with civilians. Section C chapter discusses DoD civilians'
opinions regarding how service members feel about them. Section D identifies
DoD civilian issues concerning the working relationship with service members.
Section E addresses service member opinions regarding how DoD civilians feel
about them. Unless indicated in the data presented below, issues identified in
sections B, C, D and E address topics which were discussed by a majority of the
people interviewed. Section F discusses the effect of bias and conflict on team
performance. Section G summarizes this chapter. Analysis of the interviews is
presented in Chapter 5.
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B. SERVICE MEMBERS' ISSUES CONCERNING WORKING
RELATIONSHIPS WITH DOD CIVILIANS
1. Continuity of Civilians
All military interviewees felt that the civilian workforce provides the
organization with continuity which assists the acquisition corps officer by
providing them with technical and functional knowledge that the service member
would not usually have. This expertise helps to educate service members about
the DoD acquisition process. The longevity of the civilian workforce helped one
interviewee to "solve problems that he did not know how to fix."
Despite the continuity that the civilian gives to the service member, military
interviewees stated that the long term employment of civilians makes them less
likely to take risks. Any risks taken by a civilian could cause future negative
repercussions for that civilian employee, while the service member who directed
the action will not face those repercussions, but may reap the short term benefit.
The possibility of failure and retribution is greater for the civilian who will remain
in the organization after the service member has taken a new assignment.
Regarding continuity, one interviewee stated that professional relationships
that develop between civilians in the organization, due to their geographical
stability and longevity can both help and hurt the organization. Specifically:
The continuity provided by civilians may cause in-breeding...you sit
around a table at a meeting and discover that one guy at the table is
the brother-in-law of another guy who is the neighbor of the first
guy. A "green suiter" (Army officer) must recognize that before he
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storms in and shoots and then realizes he screwed up. I did not
recognize this relationship at first and expected people to do certain
things that were impossible given the relationship that existed. This
may complicate the business relationship and personality comes into
play more than you would care to see.
In contrast, these professional relationships, at times, aided many of the military
interviewees. The same interview subject stated that:
[I]n many instances a problem looked unsolveable, and a civilian
would pipe up, "I know so and so who I'll call to get the problem
fixed" - And the problem would get fixed a lot quicker than if we
had to use the chain of command...
Interviewees shared another aspect of civilian continuity: the parochial
nature exhibited by civilians protecting their own domain in the organization. This
is often referred to as a "rice-bowl" mentality - i.e., people look out for their own
"rice bowls". Service members interviewed feel that civilians will look out for
their own interests, despite what is needed by the organization because their job or
reputation may depend on their action or inaction. This self-serving mentality and
the closed mind that service members associate with it is a source of frustration to
military personnel. The result of this self-serving mentality is that progress of the
organization is affected. For example:
We had to re-organize the division, but a civilian on the team refused
to cooperate or participate because he knew his power base would go
away if the group accomplished what it had set out to do. His boss
had put him on the team because he knew [the team member] would
be obstinate. The boss's power would be eroded as well, so he [the
boss] did not want the team to accomplish anything. The team
member reported back to the boss on what the team was doing - or
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not doing, thanks to him. He continually threw up road blocks to
any progress that the team made or was trying to make.
Finally, interviewees stated that the lack of civilian rotation allowed certain
civilian employees to wait out a service member. If the civilian employee was not
motivated to support the service member, the eventual departure of that service
member might encourage the employee to simply wait until the service member
departed the organization and not perform the required task.
2. Motivation of Civilians
A major topic discussed by service members (eighty-three percent of
interviewees) was motivation of civilian employees. The prime motivator for
civilians was seen as money.
Civilians are only motivated by a paycheck. The innovators and
motivators have risen to the top. Those that are left behind are
motivated only by money.
Another interviewee expressed that his fellow officers feel:
...Civilians are less [dedicated] than military since they are being
bribed...performance appraisals alone do not motivate
civilians... dollars motivate civilians.
All interview subjects stated that the most difficult adjustment they had to
make while working on an IPT or in a civilian organization was that they were
dealing with civilians and had to motivate civilian employees differently than
military. Ten military officers stated that they learned they could not just order
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their employees to act and had to learn new ways to motivate people. One military
officer summed up this issue succinctly:
There are two attitudes that military officers have towards civilians.
One is the arrogant military, that civilians are wimps. The other is
the collegial military that recognize we are all on the same team
although the civilian wears a different suit. Some military are not
problem solvers but accusers. A military officer must understand the
civilian culture and work with it or he will never succeed.
Another interviewee expressed the same feelings in this interview:
The military must work with civilians or they will fail. They cannot
antagonize the workforce. They must make friends. They [the
military] cannot order a civilian to do anything but must motivate
them. They must develop a relationship.
This opinion was reinforced by a third interviewee who stated:
...when military has the attitude "I'm in charge," he will fail. When
he takes the attitude "I can learn from civilians who have worked in
the job," he will succeed. An attitude of I'm here to learn, you're
here to teach me, or a mentor-protege relationship, will serve an
officer well.
All service members expressed that they had to make significant
adjustments to the civilian work environment. They needed to use different
motivational techniques to get people to work together as a team. Instead of
ordering people as they had in the past, they needed to encourage and motivate
people to do what they wanted. One interviewee noted the actions of two Majors
who reported to him:
I watched these two arrogant Majors come in and approach civilians
with their [the military] noses up in the air. I took them aside and
told them they would not get anything accomplished like this. They
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needed to approach these people as a part of the team. We [the
program management office] had to get the test site cleaned up. At
first, they went in and said "It is your job and you will do it," which
got them nowhere. They went back again and said, "Hey guys, we
have this problem, and we need your help. We [the Majors] can
contribute these resources, do you guys think you can help?" This
approach got the assistance that they needed.
Unlike military officers who may be motivated by the opportunity for
training, interview subjects did not see training as a motivator for civilians. Job
requirements, the lack of another person to perform the job in the trainee's absence
and personal hardships were identified as factors discouraging civilian employees
from attending training for any length of time.
In contrast, military personnel cited pride in work performed as a motivator
for many civilians. Many interviewees (sixty-six percent) cited that civilian
employees were motivated by the work required by military operations such as
Desert Storm. To emphasize this point, an interviewee referred to a statement
made by a retiring Command Sergeant Major of the Army:
I had never realized how dedicated civilians were. I never worked
with civilians before. ..and didn't think much of them... didn't know
much about civilians. Now I have a better appreciation for the work
these people do... I appreciate the hard work and dedication that these
people put forth.
While this new environment forced the individuals to adjust their
management style from ordering to motivating, they all felt that the adjustment
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was beneficial to their professional development, as illustrated by the following
example:
Working in a civilian organization gave me exposure to things I
never would have seen otherwise. I met people in civil service
careers that I never would have been exposed to otherwise...people
with physical handicaps, that overcame those challenges to perform
rewarding work... I never would have seen this anyplace else.
3. Leadership
While a civilian work environment may have required an adjustment for
service members, seventy-five percent of interview subjects stated military officers
make better leaders than their civilian counterparts. These military interviewees
based this ability on leadership training provided to the military which is not
provided to the civilian workforce. One interviewee stated:
The military has better leadership abilities over civilians, even at the
senior levels. The leadership aspect is emphasized in [military]
training. Civilians may be smart managers, but not leaders. A leader
looks out for his employees. A leader will visit his employees in the
hospital. A civilian manager may not even know where the hospital
is. A military officer and his wife will not only know where the
hospital is but will visit often. A military leader must worry about
the family members that a [military] guy leaves behind and if the
service members can pay their bills. Service to employees has a
close link to leadership.
This interview subject felt that good civilian leaders were lacking in DoD
acquisition.
Another leadership trait mentioned by all military officers is the career
guidance provided by service members to their military peers and subordinates.
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Members of the military serve as mentor to other officers, providing informal job
and training advice. The counseling aspect of leadership was shared:
When I was enlisted, I was considering my career options. I went
into the chiefs office and showed him the re-enlistment letter I had
received. He stated that he felt I would make a good officer, and
explained the educational benefits that the Army offered. If I hadn't
spoken to him, I doubt that I would ever have gone to college.
The same interview subject shared the following about the counseling he performs:
I frequently talk to officers about the professional and educational
benefits in their future, and we discuss the best options. I spoke to
an officer just the other day, via e-mail, about an educational
opportunity that was going to be presented to him and we discussed
the best course of action for him. I don't have civilians coming in
my office and asking for advice. I don't have similar discussions
with civilians.
The caring and coaching demonstrated by this interviewee is one trait of
good leadership which should be provided to members of the organization. Not
only does this build employee loyalty to the leader and the organization, it also
demonstrates to others in the organization that this (military) leader cares about the
employees' future.
4. Time
All military subjects raised the issue of time and feel that many civilians are
clock watchers which impedes progress and accomplishments of the organization.
Interviewees stated that many civilians were concerned about the clock, coming in
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exactly on time, getting the right amount of time for lunch and leaving exactly on
time. One interview subject stated:
...Some civilians (but not all) do not care if my hair is on fire, they
are going to leave at 1600 hours. It doesn't matter what needs to get
done, they are walking out the door. I can order an officer to stay,
but I cannot make a civilian stay past quitting time...
All interview subjects expressed frustration over regulations that address
civilian travel on personal time. Civilians cannot be forced to travel on personal
time but service members can be directed to travel after normal duty hours. These
interviewees expressed annoyance that civilian employees can request
compensation for travel time outside of normal duty hours, while a military officer
cannot. One officer stated:
[Tjhis is what separates the loyal civilians from the ones that are not
dedicated. Those that refuse to travel on their own time, travel on
Thursday [after hours] and don't come to work on a Friday, saying
they traveled on their own time. This separates the good, dedicated
employees from the bad.
However, one interviewee stated that differences between military and civilian
attitudes toward work time tend to dissipate once an individual works in the
Washington D.C. headquarters environment.
Once you get to the Pentagon, you see both military and civilian
watch the clock, if they are in a carpool. Suddenly, it doesn't matter
what is going on, if their carpool is leaving, they have to go. But
once they are out of that environment, they [the military] don't focus
on the clock as much but the civilian will work to the clock.
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The issue of time and the different rules which apply to military and civilian
employees appear to be a contentious and volatile issue based on the intensity and
lengthy discourse used by military interviewees to address the issue.
Another aspect of time, as it relates to deadlines, was discussed by another
service member. He stated that civilians frustrate him because they do not
accomplish assignments within an acceptable time period. This military
interviewee stated that civilians are too slow to complete assignments and
expressed frustration that civilians frequently question various aspects of an
assignment (e.g., why an assignment is required, the correct mechanism to
complete an assignment).
A civilian will ask, "Why?" and a military will not only jump but
ask, "How high?" The civilian works in a more deliberate fashion,
whereas the military wants closure...due to the fact that civilians
have time to work the issue.
The same interviewee stated that military officers complete an assignment in a
more timely manner.
Another interviewee emphasized this point. His experience with civilians
showed that "civilians were not as concerned about deadlines". This officer's
team experience showed him that civilians have difficulty keeping to a timetable;
while military team members focus on task completion.
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C. WHAT DO SERVICE MEMBERS THINK OF US (CIVILIANS)?
Most civilians interviewed (ninety-one percent) predicted that military
officers would describe civilians as clock watchers. They noted that service
members were surprised when their civilian counterparts worked as many (or
possibly more) hours than service members. These civilians stated that the
military think that service members work more hours daily since they are on a 24
hour work clock. One civilian countered this perception noting that, although the
two groups may put in the same number of hours, service members are entitled to
physical training time, which takes them away from the office for one to one and
one-half hours daily. Based on the use of this time for physical training, civilians
stated that they work an equal numbers of hours. Another interview subject stated
that in his recent experience, civilian employees put in more hours than their
military counterparts.
One civilian saw the time demands of work to be an inherent feature of the
acquisition environment that affected both military and civilians equally.
Military may put in more hours [than civilians] in the acquisition
environment simply based on the nature of the jobs that the military
hold...[I]n a program manager's office... a civilian in a similar
position, will put in as many hours... [I]t is the nature of the job.
All interviewees stated that most service members view civilians as
functional experts. Although this may not be recognized by the military officer
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immediately, once it is recognized, they depend on civilian employees as a subject
matter expert in acquisition procedures and technical matters.
Civilians state that the military do not sufficiently appreciate the role
civilians play in providing continuity to the organization. The experience that
civilians have in one organization may mean that past mistakes are not repeated
and work may be performed more effectively. On the same subject, however, one
civilian employee stated that the continuity provided by civilians may not be
viewed positively by the military. Civilian continuity may be seen as an
unwillingness to move geographically:
The military may view civilians as squatters... some civilians
complain about separation due to travel or training, while these guys
[military officers] experience longer separations from their families
under much more difficult conditions...The military may view
civilians as whiners and complainers because of this.
Another opinion frequently expressed was that service members may be
jealous of civilians. The military may think that civilians have it easier than
service members, have made fewer sacrifices but get better pay and benefits.
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D. DOD CIVILIAN ISSUES CONCERNING WORKING
RELATIONSHIPS WITH MILITARY
1. Rotation and Equity of Career Opportunities
The rotation of service members through an organization was discussed by
all civilians interviewed. Military rotation is seen to present both positive and
negative consequences for the organization and its employees. Interview subjects
unanimously agreed that military officers should stay in a position for at least a
major acquisition milestone review, if not longer. One interview subject stated the
following:
A Project/Program manager [e.g., military officer] should stay
around to reap the rewards of work - good or bad - [the individual]
should be there long enough to deal with issues they generate. If
they commit to an acquisition strategy, they ought to be there to
work it through to its conclusion and not leave the battlefield damage
for the rest of us to clean up.
This individual was not alone in thinking that service members should stay in
place longer. All participants stated that military officers should stay in place
longer than the current average of two to three years.
Out of the eleven civilians interviewed, eight stated that the constant
rotation of service members did not contribute to the strategic vision of the
organization. The temporary assignment of the military officer in charge causes an
organization to emphasize a short term strategy over a long term strategy, focusing
only on those tangible successes achievable while in the position.
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Based on interviews conducted, continuous military rotation creates some
resentment on the part of civilian employees in the Acquisition community.
Three of the eleven civilian interview subjects stated that they often tired of
training the officers that come through their organizations, knowing that those
officers would leave in two to three years. It was also stated that service members
receive better assignments and are provided more meaningful career experience
and exposure to senior level personnel. In one instance, a civilian stated that jobs
have been created to provide a military officer with visibility and responsibility to
enhance that person's career, but deserving civilians are not given the same
opportunity:
The military career path requires visibility. Positions will be created
to provide an officer with the visibility and responsibility that they
[the officer] requires. A deserving civilian will be in the field for
years with little visibility, and be more deserving, but will not get the
same opportunities. The military gets more recognition and better
jobs. I watched one [military] come into the organization and get the
position simply because he needed the experience - not because he
had any expertise.
Ninety-one percent of civilians interviewed expressed frustration with the
inequality with the promotion and education of service members versus civilian
employees. They stated that promotions and training opportunities (e.g., advanced
schooling) are more automatic for service members and that an officer's career is
almost guided for them. One interviewee stated the following:
I find it somewhat disturbing to note that Congress wants to see
equality between military and civilian in Program Management and
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then you open up the January/February 1997 issue of Army
Research, Development and Acquisition magazine and you see
almost no civilians in the photographs.
Many interviewees added, however, that promotions have become much more
difficult for service members in the recent past.
A related issue raised by all interviewees was that, although military
rotation creates difficulties for an organization, more military should rotate
through Acquisition organizations. They feel this is good for both military and
civilian employees. Military employees gain valuable experience from exposure
to a civilian organization, at a junior level in their career, in advance of taking
charge of a civilian organization. Many military officers that take charge of a
primarily civilian organization without prior exposure to that type of organization
are at a disadvantage.
The rotation of service personnel was seen as having some benefit to
civilians as well. All interviewees stated that, as a result of the rate of rotation,
civilian employees benefit from increased exposure to their military counterparts
and may be less likely to stereotype service members as they have more exposure
to officers. As stated by one civilian:
...more exposure [to military] for civilians would help...The current
lack of exposure and understanding of the military [by civilians]
provide little appreciation of the military culture....
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Service members also bring a fresh perspective into an organization. Along with
this new viewpoint, the military officer provides the perspective of the equipment
user. This user insight is a perspective that a civilian rarely, if ever, possesses. All
interview subjects agreed that despite the negative aspects of rotation, the service
member brings a knowledge of the battlefield, the needs of the equipment user and
provides a military perspective that is crucial to the acquisition process.
2. Military Evaluation System
Another topic frequently discussed by interview subjects (ninety-one
percent) was the strong focus of the military on their performance evaluations.
Ten of the eleven civilians interviewed felt the focus on military evaluations is
detrimental to the organization. The perception is that this emphasis on
performance evaluations, at times, causes military personnel to concentrate on
issues that will only have a positive effect on their evaluation:
I've seen instances where service members refused to do a job - a job
they knew was important - because it would have a negative effect
on their evaluation. A major stated "wait a second guys, you realize
if I do this, that I may get a poor rating because Lieutenant Colonel
"Smith" [his rater] has not told me to do what you are asking. Yes, I
realize it is important, but I live and die by my rating." What he was
being asked to do was vital to the program's success but he refused
because his rater may give him a poor review - it didn't matter what
was important to the program or the guy in the field.
The result may be a focus on issues that may not be important to the organization
or beneficial to the acquisition process.
In order to receive a favorable performance appraisal, it was felt that some
military officers were unable to delegate duties and had to manage every task,
since their careers depend on what is written in the performance report. Since
service members' career success is dependent on their rating, they will not rely on
civilian technical expertise to solve critical problems. These same officers,
however will use the civilian technical experts for administrative and clerical
functions until they have "worn them out and ruined the morale of the
organization," which can have disastrous consequences for the organizations. An
example illustrates:
A Colonel can be very interested in issues that are not important to
the grand scheme of things - interested in all flash and no substance
and loses credibility with the work force and never recovers. A
Colonel looking to get promoted to General Officer is especially
dangerous. This type of officer uses civilians as rocket fuel to get
into BG [Brigadier General] orbit.
While service members may show a strong focus on their performance
evaluations, a civilian interviewee stated that military performance measures that
are used do not ensure that DoD acquisition needs are being met:
Military performance reports focus too much on vague system cost,
schedule and performance factors and do not address specific
accomplishments in the program. The program may be in bad shape
but the [officer's] performance report will still be favorable.
Most civilians understand the reason behind the military focus on the evaluation
since it is the primary basis for retention and promotion. The same civilians also
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stated that this focus may not be beneficial to the organization since the efforts that
result in a favorable rating may not be the same elements that will benefit the
acquisition program.
3. Military Adjustment from Management of an Operational
Environment to a Business Organization
All interviewees agreed that many military members must adjust to a
civilian environment. Many interview subjects referred to the acquisition
environment as a "business environment," and stated that it differs from a military
environment since the acquisition of weapon systems depends heavily on business
decisions, unlike a military operational environment.
A service member may adjust their management style to fit this civilian
dominated organization. The military leader who assumes that a civilian
organization can be run like an military unit may not succeed. A military leader
who wants to succeed in a business organization might learn from the following:
In a civilian organization, people don't kill themselves for you
because you are the figurehead boss. People kill themselves for you
because they admire you and want to go where you want to take
them.
Another civilian interview subject went on to share what he witnessed when
an officer came into a business environment and how that officer adjusted his
leadership style:
When this Colonel came into a civilian organization, initially he
tried to run it like a military organization, and realized that it
wouldn't work. Once he came to grips with the fact that he was in a
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business organization and people reacted better to a business
approach and not a military approach, he got much more respect
from everybody and got a lot more done. Once he realized that he
was managing a small number of civilians (not 300 - 400 people) and
a LOT of money, he did a great job.
Once this individual realized that he was working with a group of professionals
who knew what needed to be done on a day-to-day basis, he trusted his employees
with the daily operation of the organization and gave them the authority they
needed to perform. He also recognized that his employees needed him to provide
direction and vision; he gave the employees the leadership they needed.
In another instance, the same interview subject addressed the opposite type
of personality who:
...was unable to trust and delegate to civilians and unable to
prioritize. This micro-management style meant everything was late
and the important work was not getting accomplished. He gave
orders to civilians and it never worked....
For both service members described above, it was their first time dealing with and
managing a civilian work force.
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4. Military Culture
Five of the eleven civilian interview subjects stated that the military culture
and wearing of a uniform make entry into the military clique easier which may
facilitate communication. These interviewees stated this occurs due to the easy
identification (via the uniform) of the service member's rank, branch,
achievements and awards. These five civilians felt frustrated by the inherent
respect and deferential treatment that military officers expect and receive. One
interview subject noted that service members are automatically addressed by
military rank (by military and civilian employees) while civilians are, almost
always, referred to by their first names. This occurs even when a title may be
appropriate for a civilian due to the individual's position in the organization or a
degree received. This casual (civilian) versus formal (military) form of address
occurs in different situations: during casual conversation, formal meetings and
conferences and in written correspondence:
A civilian is always addressed by their first name. I see junior
officers do this constantly, even with a Senior Executive Service
employee [military equivalent is a General Officer] when the same
individual would never dream of calling a General Officer by their
first name. On a conference agenda, military names always have a
title attached whereas the civilian is referred to by first and last
name, not even with a Mr. or Ms.
Another interview subject added that the military gives its members an
immediate fraternal bond and that the fraternal nature of the organization gives its
58
members many "privileges" that civilians envy. One aspect is the mentor-protege
relationship which develops between junior and senior officers. This relationship
takes place both during and after duty hours (on a professional and personal basis)
and may continue throughout the officers' careers. The formation of this type of
mentor-protege relationship provides professional contacts and opportunities that
may not have occurred without the relationship.
One interview subject stated that the military may look down on civilians
(perhaps due to lack of a visible rank) until the service member can figure out
where the civilian fits in the organization and what the civilian member can or
cannot do to support the service member's interests.
Many times a military officer will ignore me in a meeting or
conversation, and then they figure out what job I fill, that I can hurt
or help their program in terms of resources. Suddenly they get very
friendly and treat me as a peer instead of assuming they can ignore
me.
While most civilian interview subjects agreed that respect is given to a
service member automatically, a small number (thirty-six percent) stated that the
officer must earn respect after the initial impression. Three interview subjects
added that, while the uniform and rank of the military give service members
automatic credibility, it could cause the military to be stereotyped as having a
specific personality type ("aggressive, rigid, conservative") or leadership style ("I
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order, you obey") Interviewees stated that these stereotypes were not always
deserved.
Three civilians stated that while the military were given privileges based on
rank but they added that many civilians do not appreciate or understand the
military culture. To illustrate, one stated:
Civilians have little appreciation of military culture... little awareness
of who the customer is... civilians at times put down military. In an
operational environment, a Colonel is God, has many people
reporting to him that he directs. In a civilian environment, people
don't appreciate that fact and, at times, do not show the military the
respect that they deserve based on their rank. A Colonel in a
military organization has hundreds of people at his beck and call. In
a civilian organization he is lucky if he has twenty people that report
directly to him.
E. WHAT DO CIVILIANS THINK OF US (THE MILITARY)?
When asked what stereotypes and biases civilians have regarding the
military, all Military interviewees stated that civilians relied on them for their
knowledge of the operational environment of the service. Many stated that
civilians had little knowledge of the battlefield. The service member's operational
knowledge combined with the civilian continuity "makes the partnership a
productive one." The interviewees felt battlefield knowledge provided by service
members is invaluable to the acquisition environment.
Eighty-three percent of military interviewees stated that civilians may think
that service members put too much emphasis on their evaluations. As one officer
stated,
We may put too much effort into getting that ticket punched [getting
the right experience and exposure] but we have to because if we
don't, we don't get promoted. This may cause us to look at only
things that affect our appraisals and not what is good for the
organization in the long run.
Seventy-five percent of military interviewees added that service members may not
be aware of the impact of their changes to the organization.
These interview subjects stated that, in conjunction with the emphasis on
military evaluation, the short tenure of service members in an organization may
force the service member to "make changes for change sake." One interviewee
stated that:
[M]any civilians probably think that the Colonel goes off half
cocked like a crazy man, that we have no idea what we're doing and
have no experience with what we are trying to change. But they
don't understand that we only have a short time to perform and get a
good OER [Officer Evaluation Report]....
All interview subjects addressed the short tenure of service members, but
not everyone stated that it was detrimental to an organization. It is viewed as a
fact of life for the military.
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F. AFFECT OF BIAS AND CONFLICT ON TEAM PERFORMANCE
As part of each interview, all subjects were asked what they felt the affect
of biases and stereotypes were on the functioning of a team. Nine civilian and
nine military interviewees stated that biases and stereotypes have not impacted
team effectiveness. One military interview subject stated that "once the employee
took the uniform or tie off, all people were seen as members of the team, as a "we
not me" group."
Eighty-two percent of civilians interviewed stated that biases were set aside
and if conflict existed, it was ignored. When asked if the military management
style might cause conflict, a civilian stated that too little conflict may exist:
The military inherently take charge, due to training and it could be a
problem if you have a bunch of bashful civilians. If the military
thinks he is an expert, he will not rely on the group.
All interviewees stated that civilians may be afraid of expressing their opinion
when a service member is part of the team, which may be reinforced by the
military management style. A military interviewee noted:
The military environment may foster ordering a team to do
something other than what they [the team] came up with. The
military may have a tendency to take advantage of a higher position,
more than civilians.
Perhaps signaling a change in the traditional command orientation of
military officers, one civilian interviewee stated that he saw a new military leader
emerging in the DoD acquisition community:
I am seeing more General Officers that are easy to get along with,
who empower the workforce as opposed to the type who give orders.
The new generation of leaders are more attuned to business practices
and the fact that their workforce is their strength.
Interviewees were asked if conflict that was evident on their team had an
affect on the team and if the conflict was resolved. All interview subjects stated
that while conflict existed between military and civilian team members, conflict
did not impact the team's performance. The conflict was not addressed by the
group; the team worked with the conflict and did not try to confront or eliminate it.
G. SUMMARY
Based on interviews conducted, service members expressed four major
issues concerning their working relationship with DoD civilians. The following
was shared by the military interviewees:
• Civilians work on a time clock and are not as dedicated as service
members
• Continuity provided by civilians is both good and bad for the
organization
• Money is the primary motivator for civilians
• Service Members are better leaders than civilians
Civilian interviewees shared what opinions service members might have
about them. They felt that service members would state:
• Civilians are too concerned about the time clock
• Civilians provide continuity
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• Civilians are the functional acquisition experts
Civilians interviewed expressed four major issues concerning their working
relationship with service members.
• Military rotation has both positive and negative impact on an
organization
• Military may place too much emphasis on their evaluations and may
neglect the team project requirements
• Military must adjust their management style for the DoD civilian
environment
• The military culture and the resulting different treatment of civilians and
military
Military interviewees shared what opinions civilians might have about
service members. Service members stated:
• Military provide knowledge of the operational environment which
benefits the organization
• Service Members may place too much emphasis on their evaluations
Interview subjects were asked if biases and stereotypes exhibited by the two
groups have an impact on team effectiveness. All interview subjects stated that
biases have little or no effect on teams.





This analysis uses the philosophy, concepts, principles and theories
expressed in the Literature Review Chapter to explain and evaluate the findings
resulting from personal interviews. The analysis addresses themes noted in
Chapter IV which were discussed by military and civilian interviewees. Within
each theme are the applicable existing literature, summary of the interview results
and the implications for IPTs. Themes are grouped by military and civilian
interview results. Military interview themes are benefits and detriments of civilian
continuity, civilian motivation, military leadership, and civilian preoccupation with
time. Civilian interview themes are military rotation and career equity, military
emphasis on evaluations, military management of a civilian organization, and the
military culture. This chapter also addresses conflict as discussed in the literature,
in interviews conducted for this research and the results for IPTs. The chapter
concludes by addressing action implications for improving team effectiveness
based on the analysis of results of the research.
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B. SERVICE MEMBERS' ISSUES CONCERNING WORKING
RELATIONSHIPS WITH DOD CIVILIANS
1. Continuity of Civilians
a. Results of literature review
As described in Chapter II, Markessini (1994) found that civilians
are more inclined than military personnel to build consensus and are less willing to
take risks. Broedling's (1979) research noted that the intent of the civilian-military
mix is that civilians provide continuity and corporate memory. Bridger (1994)
states that the military requires civilian continuity for institutional knowledge.
While he did not relate it specifically to civilian continuity, Bridger also states that
officers assume that civilians are less responsive to service members; and Long
(1977) concluded that civilians wait out the transfer of commanding officers to
avoid doing things with which they disagree.
b. Results of research
Service members interviewed for this research cite positive and
negative consequences of civilian continuity and reinforce aspects of the literature.
Specifically, they cite that civilian continuity provides historical knowledge to an
organization but noted negative impacts of civilian continuity; the parochial
civilian viewpoint and civilian disregard of a service member's directive due to the
eventual departure of the service member. Civilians validated military comments
that civilians provide continuity and functional expertise.
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Service members interviewed extended the existing literature by
stating that civilian continuity provides innovative problem solving methods.
c. Implications for IPTs
The literature cites that an organization with indifferent and
unaccepting attitudes towards out-group members will not benefit from the
potential contributions of all members of the workforce (Bartunek, 1996;
Schneider, 1996; Schreiber, 1996). If civilians view military as outsiders, soon to
depart the organization, ignoring their suggestions or directives, the group does not
benefit from military participation. A collective work product (Katzenbach and
Smith, 1991) will not be achieved if the group members do not recognize the
interests of others, which may result if civilians are self-serving.
2. Motivation of Civilians
a. Results of literature review
The literature states the military perceive that civilians must be
motivated, and not ordered, to perform (Bridger, 1994). Woolley, et al (1986),
state that the military concentrates on cash awards as a primary tool to motivate
civilians, but other rewards may be equally effective. Training, however, while
usually effective as a personnel motivator, may not motivate civilians since they
see little relationship between training and promotions. This is in contrast to
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service members who can see a direct link between the two (Woolley, et al., 1986
and Bridger, 1994).
b. Results of research
Confirming the existing literature, all service members interviewed
stated that they had to motivate civilian employees differently than subordinate
service members and, instead of ordering people, had to treat civilians as a fellow
member of a team. While service members validated the existing literature, stating
their perception that money is the primary motivator for civilians, they added that
pride in work performed also motivates civilians.
Another area where service members reinforce the literature is in the
area of training as a motivator. They perceive that training, which may motivate
the military, may not motivate civilians. Service members note that the military
see a direct link between training and promotions, civilians do not.
Military and civilian interviewees stated that service members and
civilians work together successfully on teams despite the different military and
civilian reward systems. The different reward systems were not viewed as a
deterrent to team performance.
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c. Implications for IPTs
Service members interviewed recognize that civilians should be
treated as a valued part of the team, as stated by Katzenbach and Smith (1991).
Katzenbach and Smith found that successful IPTs reward team performance, but if
rewards given by team leaders do not motivate individuals to support IPT efforts
(e.g., training may motivate military but may not motivate civilians), the desired
team work product may not be realized. If other rewards are available to motivate
team members (e.g., ceremonies, performance certificates), they should be used to
recognize contribution to team performance. Although interviewees state that their
IPTs were effective without team based awards, the literature asserts that team
based awards motivate IPTs to produce a collective work product (Katzenbach and
Smith, 1991).
3. Leadership
a. Results of literature review
Katzenbach and Smith (1991) state that good teams have shared
leadership roles and should have a personal bond. Bridger (1994) states that
civilians would rather work for an officer because the uniform signals leadership
and the rank and file look for leadership. Skinner (1993), however, stated that
Army leaders fail to provide effective leadership to Army civilians. Woolley, et
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al. (1986) stated that the groups were critical of the other group's knowledge and
experience supervising their group.
b. Results of research
Military statements that they are better leaders than civilians
contradict Skinner's (1993) research which found that Army leaders fail to provide
leadership to civilians. While service members confirm Bridger's (1994) literature
which states that civilians look for leadership and find it via the military whose
uniform signals leadership for civilians, civilians state that service members who
use a stereotypical authoritative leadership style do not succeed in a civilian
organization. However, service members interviewed commented that they were
better leaders than civilians which confirms Woolley, et al.'s (1986) work which
states that both groups are critical of the other group's knowledge and experience
supervising their group.
Military interviewees state the high quality leadership they provide is
demonstrated by the concern they show for their employees and the mentor-
protege relationship encouraged between military members. Although noted as a
key ingredient for successful military leaders, this mentor-protege relationship was
not seen by any interviewee as a facet of the military-civilian relationship.
Military interviewees stated that service members are more effective leaders than
civilians, which may indicate that leadership roles are not shared between service
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members and civilians, which Katzenbach and Smith (1993) cite as a main
ingredient for effective teams. Although civilians noted different leadership
approaches employed by service members that are successful (team management)
and unsuccessful (authoritative leadership approach), civilians interviewed did not
comment on the quality of military leadership compared to civilian leadership.
c. Implications for IPTs
Leadership provided by service members may foster better teams.
Service members state their actions demonstrate that they care about their team
members which Jehn (1995) states may reduce team friction, resulting in a more
effective team. The effective military leadership traits noted by military
interviewees (mentor-protege, care of subordinates) may ensure minority (civilian)
group acceptance (Cox, 1991) which may reduce conflict and bias. However,
these effective leadership traits mentioned by service members will foster good
team relationships only if provided to all team members. If a mentor-protege
relationship is extended to only the military team members, excluding minority
(civilian) members, group friction may increase. If service members (and




a. Results of literature review
Bridger (1994) states that civilian use of compensatory time,
overtime and quitting time frustrate service members who are required to stay until
an assignment is complete. Long (1977) stated that civilians are not willing to
work more that 40 hours per week in order to do a good job. Woolley, et al.
(1986) confirm that a source of irritation (for the military) is that the military "has
to stay, you guys (civilians) get to go home (at 5:30)."
b. Results of research
All military interviewees agreed that civilians are clock watchers,
confirming the existing literature. Service members are frustrated by systemic
differences such as travel regulations that force military to travel on their own
time, without additional compensation, but compensate civilians who travel on
their own time. They claim that civilians do not accomplish assignments in an
acceptable timeframe and are not as concerned about deadlines. Civilian
interviews confirmed that service members view civilians as clock watchers.
c. Implications for IPTs
Katzenbach and Smith (1993) note that the essence of a team is
common commitment. Without common commitment, groups do not perform as
teams but as individuals; with common commitment, individuals collectively
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perform toward a common goal or work product. If military members of an IPT
feel that civilians are not as dedicated as the military team members, friction may
develop and the team may lose its collective drive.
The literature states that strong teams need to develop a common
approach, determine how work will be accomplished and how schedules will be
set and adhered to (Katzenbach and Smith, 1993; Jehn 1995). The different
military and civilian views regarding time may hinder these actions and introduce
unhelpful conflict in the team. An IPT leader should ensure the group has a
common approach to carry out the group's goals.
C. DOD CIVILIAN ISSUES CONCERNING WORKING
RELATIONSHIPS WITH MILITARY
1. Rotation and Equity of Career Opportunities
a. Results of literature review
The literature noted that civilians state inequities exist between the
two groups. Markessini, Lucas and Chandler (1994) state that distribution of
educational benefits is not equal between the groups. Apple's (1973) thesis stated
that two distinct career services and the different personnel systems that support
the groups provide a source of conflict for the groups.
Young's (1985) research notes that another difference between the
two groups is the transient nature of the military. Broedling (1979) found that
military rotation provides new suggestions as well as knowledge about fleet needs.
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As noted in existing research, the following are all potential sources of conflict:
experience, education, personnel and reward systems and cultural influences.
b. Results of research
Civilians interviewed state that inequities do exist in the promotion
and education of the two groups. They perceive that service members receive
better assignments and more exposure to senior level personnel which may
enhance the service member's career and noted that the same opportunities were
not provided to them.
With the exception of Broedling (1979), who noted the positive
aspects of military rotation, existing literature does not address military rotation as
a detriment to an organization but merely as a difference between the two groups.
In contrast, civilians interviewed for this research state that military rotation has
positive and negative consequences for an organization. Confrrming Broedling'
s
results, civilians state that the positive aspects of rotation are that service members
provide organizational knowledge of the battlefield, the needs of the equipment
user and a military perspective that is crucial to the acquisition process. Both
groups benefit from increased exposure since, as a result, civilians are less likely
to stereotype the military and may care more about the welfare of service
members. Service members interviewed agree that they provide knowledge of the
operational environment which benefits the IPT but did not cite any negative
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aspects of military rotation. On the negative side, civilians in this study stated that
military rotation does not contribute to the strategic, long term vision of the
organization and burdens the organization due to the increased training required to
support a continuous influx of service members.
c. Implications for IPTs
Despite the negative aspects of military rotation, it does provide the
cross functional expertise that Kaminski (1995) asserts is necessary to maximize
IPT performance. Milliken (1996) states that diverse groups relate better to their
customers; military rotation through an organization provides IPT diversity and a
relationship with the equipment user. In addition, Messick and Mackie (1991) cite
that increased interpersonal contact may improve intergroup relations. Most
civilians interviewed felt that increased contact between the groups is good for
IPTs.
Civilian team members may view a service member as someone who
cannot, due to their limited tenure in the organization, contribute to the long range
view of the organization. The military focus on the short term, versus the civilian
focus on long term outcomes, may result in a team with competing work priorities,
which could ultimately lead to conflict among team members. This implies that it
is important for IPTs to acknowledge the different outcomes desired by each team
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member and ensure that they are met by the team without undennining the goals of
the group.
In addition, perceived career inequities have potential for negative
consequences for IPTs. Katzenbach and Smith (1991) state in well functioning
teams, members provide support to other team members, focusing on collective
work products. Civilian team members' perceptions that military receive a greater
benefit from the team's effort (i.e., better assignments and more exposure to senior
level personnel, enhancing the service members' career) could result in lack of
support to team goals. Perceptions of inequity of rewards for team performance
contradicts the recommendations in the literature for team based rewards and
could be a source of conflict and reduced team effectiveness in producing
collective work products.
2. Military Evaluation System
a. Results of literature review
Literature reviewed in Chapter II does not discuss military emphasis
on performance evaluations and its effect on the military-civilian relationship.
b. Results of research
Although not addressed in existing literature, civilians interviewed
perceive that the strong military focus on performance evaluations is detrimental to
IPTs and the acquisition process. Interviewees stated that the military's reliance
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on their performance appraisal resulted in behaviors that hindered team efficiency
and effectiveness due to:
• an unwillingness to delegate
• lack of reliance on civilian technical experts
• emphasis on short term measures not long term results required
for IPT success
Service members confirmed civilian statements regarding military emphasis on
performance evaluations and its affect on IPT functioning, but did not state it was
detrimental to IPT performance.
c. Implications for IPTs
Katzenbach and Smith (1991) state that effective teams recognize the
interests and achievements of others, give others the benefit of the doubt, and have
collective work products. If service members focus only on those areas that will
benefit their individual performance appraisal, team collective work products may
suffer, since the goals of the officer and the goals of the team may not be the same.
Service members who refuse to rely on civilian expertise overlook
the achievement and competence of those civilians; Katzenbach and Smith (1991)
note this as an essential team attribute. Likewise, if civilians feel that negative
consequences will result from their interactions with the military (e.g., rejection,
frustration), avoidance, withdrawal and conflict may result (Stephan and Stephan,
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1985). Civilians must also recognize the needs of the service members and
consequence of a negative military evaluation (possible termination). If the group
works together to meet the needs of the individual team members, together with
the goals of the group, the team's objectives will be met.
3. Military Adjustment from Management of an Operational
Environment to a Business Organization
a. Results of literature review
Bridger (1994) states that service members simply dictate to civilian
employees because they are the boss and that service members assume that
civilians are less responsive to the military. Woolley, et al (1986), found that
civilians were critical of military knowledge and management of civilians.
Markessini's (1994) quoted one civilian who stated, "Military simply do not care
about civilians...they want to get whatever they can from civilians".
b. Results of research
Research conducted indicates that military should not manage
civilians using a stereotypical authoritative militaristic leadership style ("I say -
you do"), and found that service members who adjust their leadership style to a
team-oriented leadership approach when in a civilian organization foster better
IPTs. While civilian interviewees stated that service members should not run a
civilian organization like a military unit, no civilian interviewed stated that the
military does not care about civilians as cited in Markessini's 1994 research.
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c. Implications for IPTs
A stereotypical military leadership style may have a negative affect
on IPTs by discouraging effective team components, such as:
• encouraging listening and constructive response to views
expressed by other team members
• shared leadership roles
• discussion of different viewpoints (Katzenbach and Smith, 1991)
If these components are not encouraged by the IPT, the result may be discouraged
and alienated team participants who may not contribute to the team or support IPT
efforts. IPTs with team members who fear disapproval and rejection produce
suboptimal IPT products. As the literature suggests, differences that exist between
military and civilians should be employed to enhance team performance.
Differences that result in alienation, withdrawal, perceived powerlessness and
rejection can inhibit team performance. Actions to resolve differences between the
groups are discussed later.
4. Military Culture
a. Results of literature review
Existing research finds that civilians feel like second class citizens
(Broedling, 1979; Wermuth, 1979; and Woolley, 1986). Particularly, Skinner
(1993) found that the military do not accept civilians as part of the team. Young
(1985) found that cultural differences between the groups are emphasized by the
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military uniform, caste-like system of the military, military quarters, and the
transient nature of the military.
If IPTs are indifferent and unaccepting towards sub-group cultures,
they may not recognize the potential contributions that team members can make,
and may not be effectively using the talent and resources that are available.
b. Results of research
Civilians interviewed support the existing literature. They did not
state specifically that they felt like "second class citizens" but commented that
service members receive better treatment than civilians (e.g., service members are
given better resource support and more respect). In addition, the military "clique"
provides a fraternity between service members that facilitates their
communications but does not include civilians. This "clique" is facilitated by the
military uniform which allows members to easily identify and relate to each other,
using well established traditions and norms.
c. Implications for IPTs
As discussed in Chapter II, the literature states that cultural
differences should be recognized and valued in order to benefit from the insight
and different perspectives that different cultures bring to a team (Bartunek, 1996;
Schneider, 1996; Schreiber, 1996). If civilians feel their perspectives are not
valued by the military IPT members, because civilians are not members of the
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military "clique," the IPT product may lack crucial civilian insight and support.
Groups that accept only the contributions from members of their same group, and
ignore contributions of other IPT members, do not use their diversified personnel
resources to maximize both team and organization performance (Bartunek, 1996;
Schneider, 1996; Schreiber, 1996).
If military IPT members receive different benefits (e.g., respect and
resource support) based on their military, not IPT, membership, it may act as a
disincentive to the non-military IPT members who do not receive the same
benefits. IPT members should receive benefits and rewards based on their IPT
contributions and results (Katzenbach and Smith, 1993).
Stephan and Stephan (1985) note that an individual's interaction
with out-group members may result in disapproval or rejection by members of that
group. Thus, civilians may fear disapproval and rejection by service members and
may avoid service members as a result.
D. INTER-GROUP CONFLICT
1. Literature Review
Brown's (1983) model on intergroup conflict defines potential sources of
conflict as personal feelings, group membership, and job differences. The
conflicts may be based on: 1) different attitudes or characteristics of an individual;
2) placement in the organization (e.g., functional affiliation) or power within the
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organization and 3) societal differences (e.g., religion or race). These potential
sources of intergroup conflict suggest that conflict cannot always be blamed on the
individual but can be derived from the individual's group membership or is
culturally embedded at the societal level.
Jehn (1995) found that conflict may increase an individual's frustration,
strain and uneasiness in a group, which may result in psychological or physical
withdrawal. Brown's research adds that conflict may encourage negative
stereotypes, decrease communication and increase differences between the groups;
power differences may further suppress group communications. If conflict is not
resolved, Jehn (1995) states that groups may spend time trying to resolve, discuss
or ignore conflict instead of working on the task.
2. Interview Results
Service members and civilians interviewed did not discuss conflict as a
factor of their IPT experience. As noted in Chapter IV, when asked if conflict was
present in IPTs, interview subjects stated if conflict was present, it did not
influence team performance and (or) was ignored. Other interviewees stated that
conflict was not present during their IPT experience.
3. Implications for IPTs
While civilians and service members state that conflict did not exist or was
ignored, the data presented above describing the military-civilian relationship
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present many opportunities for conflict. In fact, a number of these opportunities
which could lead to conflict on an IPT were identified in previous sections and are
summarized here within the context of Brown's model on intergroup conflict
(1983) which first addresses personal attitudes and perceptions:
• civilians are clock watchers
• civilians are not willing to make sacrifices such as traveling on their
own time
• civilians must be motivated differently from the military
• military do not view civilians as team members
• service members focus on their performance evaluations, not
organizational benefit
• military use a stereotypical authoritarian leadership style
Brown's model continues with the conflict produced by group association.
Conflict related to group association for service members and civilians results
from differences in the training, personnel and promotion systems for the two
groups. In addition, civilians have a strong group association at the local level,
due to their long association with a single organization at one geographic location.
This latter aspect of local group affiliation is not a facet of the military culture due
to their frequent rotation. An IPT should recognize the potential divisiveness of
inequities derived from the two group's formal support systems (e.g., training,
promotion). In addition, an IPT should recognize the potential benefits presented
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from lengthy civilian associations, but must also recognize that civilian longevity
may foster parochialism and a reluctance to take risks.
In contrast to local group associations within the civilian culture, a service
member is associated with the larger military institution or "society" above the
organization or group level. Civilians are not part of this larger military society,
which focuses on traditions, ranks, mentor-protege relationships, rules and
regulations. Brown warns that the exclusion of team members due to societal
differences may be a source of conflict for IPTs. IPTs should acknowledge the
opportunities and challenges presented by the societal aspects of the military
culture.
Along with the societal recognition of military officers, military rank
inherent in the DoD also provides levels of power. Each time an officer wears the
uniform, the level and amount of power is visible (i.e., a General Officer has more
power than a Major). The different power levels due to military rank, may lead to
conflict avoidance, due to low-powered civilians' fear of repercussion when
addressing contentious issues with high-power officers. This avoidance of conflict
can result in dysfunctional team performance. The lack of constructive IPT
conflict between IPT members with different power levels, and their unwillingness
to disagree, may result in a group that simply defers to the high-powered members
of the team.
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As noted, although not reported by interviewees as an issue, the potential
for conflict between the groups is great. If methods that resolve or implement
conflict are not employed, the presence or absence of conflict may ultimately
affect EPT productivity and performance.
E. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
1. Results of Literature Review
Brown (1983) states that conflict is present in most organizations but
usually goes unrecognized. His model proposes that a moderate level of conflict is
desired for a group - too much or too little may be harmful. Brown states that in
order to manage conflict, it must first be diagnosed by reviewing the attitudes,
behavior and structure of a group. In addition, the power structure of the
organization and societal differences must be analyzed and managed to ensure
constructive conflict.
Conflict reduction may include training and orientation, insuring minority
group acceptance, career development, mentoring and social events (Cox, 1991),
institutional and legislative change and decrease of stereotypes by increased
personal contact (Messick and Mackie, 1989). Ware and Barnes (1991) present
three strategies for managing interpersonal conflict: bargaining, controlling, and
constructive confrontation. These conflict management techniques may be useful
to the IPT leader when conflict is present.
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2. Interview Results
As previously noted, interview subjects stated that IPT conflict either did
not exist or was avoided by the group. Given the data previously presented, this
assessment suggests that the conflict may be "too little" (Brown, 1983) and critical
differences are being avoided.
3. Implications for IPTs
There is evidence from the literature reviewed to support this research that
intergroup conflict, when ignored or avoided, may have a negative impact on IPT
effectiveness. For example, different group communication styles may create
difficulties for effective team functioning. The military leadership and
communication style and desire to take charge may result in a team that does only
what the service member orders. Civilian team members may be unwilling to
challenge a service member's opinion and may not express their viewpoints due to
the desire to avoid conflict. The result may be an ineffective team which does not
utilize the potential contribution of all IPT members, resulting in a suboptimal IPT
product.
In addition, since DoD is a bureaucracy which is built on the rank and grade
of its employees, the power differences cited in Brown's (1983) model are
especially important to DoD IPTs since the differences may promote minimal
conflict between the groups. IPT "low power" groups may fear the negative
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consequences of conflict with a "high power" (e.g., high ranking military) group;
an IPT "high power" group may desire a minimal level of conflict. The result of
conflict avoidance for DoD IPTs may ultimately be the procurement of weapon
systems which are not cost or mission effective.
To encourage conflict and discussion of different views between groups,
Brown (1983) suggests that high powered IPT members learn the impact that
productive conflict has on an IPT, and low powered IPT members be provided
assurance that their productive conflict with high power group members will not
be punished. To improve the flow of information between these groups, Brown
suggests that trustworthy protection be provided to the low powered group and
effective education be provided to the high powered group. If productive conflict
is desired to produce effective IPT results, it must be nurtured and rewarded
throughout the organization.
Brown cautions that the boundary between too little conflict and too much
conflict is easily crossed. Should the level of IPT conflict be raised above a
constructive level, the author suggests conflict management methods which may
be employed by an IPT. To change attitudes of each group towards the other:
• provide training about the other group's culture
• establish civilian-military mentor-protege relationships
• increase exposure to the other group throughout their career
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Conflict may also be reduced by recognizing structure differences (Brown,
1993) between military and civilians. These differences may be reduced by
recognizing differences between military and civilian career development
opportunities and varied treatment of the groups for travel on personal time,
compensatory time and overtime.
Brown concludes his conflict reduction methods by recognizing and
working with societal and group differences. These are present in the DoD
community with the presence of the overarching military institution at a societal
level and civilian group association at a local level.
Ware and Barnes (1991) conflict management techniques, which encourage
bargaining or negotiation, controlling the conflict and constructive confrontation,
may be used by an IPT when excessive conflict exists. Bargaining or negotiating
may be employed by providing a neutral third party to bargain, giving incentives to
go beyond conflict and finding a solution acceptable to both sides.
Implementation of behavioral guidelines may reduce conflict, and
may include:
• establishing hours for the IPT to accomplish work
• use of military rank and formal professional titles (e.g., Dr., Ms.)
when addressing each other
• accepting contributions of military and civilian IPT participants
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Conflict may also be controlled by acknowledging and reducing
external pressures via:
• acknowledging military performance need for report focus and
balancing that with long term IPT results
• recognizing the value of civilian continuity in organization, and
potential repercussions of IPT action for civilians
• providing support to make conflict tolerable
Constructive confrontation may also help reduce excessive conflict
and may be achieved by the exploration and understanding of military and
civilian perceptions (such as the military perception that civilians are only
motivated by money) and provide mechanisms and motivation to
acknowledging conflict and resolving it to the benefit of the IPT.
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Interviews conducted with service members and civilians confirm existing
literature in the following areas. First, military personnel perceive that:
• Civilian continuity provides historical knowledge to the organization but
civilians have a parochial viewpoint, are less willing to take risks, and
may wait out the departure of a service member to avoid work.
• Civilians must be motivated differently than military officers.
• Civilians are clock watchers and unresponsive to deadlines.
• There are systemic differences between military and civilian
compensation for overtime and travel during personal time.
The following civilian perceptions regarding the military confirm the
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existing literature:
• Military rotation provides the operational knowledge required by the
acquisition community.
• Civilians state that inequities exist between the promotion and education
of the two groups.
• Military should not use a stereotypical, authoritative military leadership
style but employ a team management approach in an IPT.
• Civilians recognize the military clique provides advantages to military
(e.g., respect and fraternity) not available to civilians
Interview results which challenge or extend the existing literature and
provide new insights are:
• Service members state they provide better leadership than civilians.
• Service members state that civilian continuity, despite the potential
negative impact to an organization, may present innovative solutions to
problems.
• Civilians state the military over-emphasize their individual performance
evaluations to the potential detriment of a team.
• Civilians state that military rotation increases an organization's training
demands and does not contribute to the long term vision of the
organization.
Implications for IPT action are presented below within the context of
Brown's research (1993) which highlights that individual, group, and societal
attitudes must be influenced to effect conflict.
To influence individual attitudes:
• IPT members should avoid conservative, firmly entrenched attitudes
which suboprimize team performance.
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• Service members must ensure that IPT performance does not suffer due
to performance evaluation emphasis.
• Both groups should be trained regarding the culture of the other group.
• Service members may need to adjust their leadership style when
working on IPTs.
• Both groups should recognize and use the operational and functional
expertise of the other group to enhance IPT performance.
To influence group and societal attitudes:
• Service members should rotate earlier and more frequently through
civilian organizations, despite any negative consequences, as both
groups benefit from increased exposure.
• Team based motivators, other than financial, should be used to reward
good IPT results.
• Effective leadership, demonstrated by service to and care of employees,
is a fundamental aspect of military culture and required for IPTs.
• Teams should adopt a common approach for setting and adhering to
schedules and accomplishing work.
Despite the numerous issues addressed in this research that may cause
conflict between the groups, all interviewees state that conflict was not an issue for
their IPTs. The implication for IPTs is that conflict is ignored and the benefits of
constructive conflict are not recognized. To ensure that an IPT is productive,
constructive conflict should be seen as beneficial to the team, as it promotes a
more honest and open exchange of members' ideas. Constructive conflict will
produce an effective IPT product which reflects members' views and capitalizes
on the expertise provided by the functional and operational specialists on the team.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Section A of this chapter summarizes existing research concerning
perceptions that military and DoD civilians have towards each other. Section B
contains the results of interviews conducted for this research regarding the
attitudes and assumptions that Acquisition Corps service members and civilians
have towards each other. Section C contains predictions regarding the success of
an IPT comprised of service members and civilians. Section D contains
recommendations for managing group conflict to ensure IPT success. Section E
cites potential areas for future research. The primary research question; "What are
the attitudes and assumptions that military officers and civilians have about each
other and how can those attitudes affect team performance?" is answered in the
sections presented below.
A. FINDINGS FROM THE LITERATURE
The first subsidiary research question asks; "What does the existing
literature state about the perceptions that DoD civilians and military officers have
towards each other?" The existing literature, as cited in Chapter II, investigates
the relationship between service members and civilians but does not address how
the relationship between the two groups affects IPTs.
Within the existing literature, service members state that civilians are not
responsive to their requirements, do not show respect to the military and the
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primary civilian motivator is money. Civilians feel that the military does not
accept them as part of the team, views civilians as second class citizens, does not
provide effective leadership to civilians, dictates to civilians, and does not care
about civilians.
Existing literature addresses civilian perceptions regarding military officers.
Civilians feel that service members view civilians as second class citizens who are
not part of the team, do not care about civilians and do not provide effective
leadership to civilians. Civilians also state that the military provides advantages to
service members that civilians do not have.
Existing research also states that the differences between the two groups are
emphasized by the military uniform, military caste-like system, military quarters,
and the transient nature of the military. Differences in the distribution of
educational and developmental benefits to the two groups are noted by executive-
level civilians.
Although the two cultures have some misunderstandings and hold
assumptions about each other, both groups state that an effective military and
civilian interface is crucial to the effective functioning of the DoD and that both
groups are crucial members of the team. The literature states that the relationship
between the two groups needs to be improved.
B. FINDINGS FROM THIS RESEARCH EFFORT
Subsidiary research question two asks; "What do the data state about the
assumptions and attitudes that Acquisition Corps military officers and DoD
civilians have towards each other?"
Interviews were conducted with twenty-three service members and civilian
employees who have been involved with IPTs. Interviews conducted with both
groups revealed dominant areas of bias which were expressed by a preponderance
of interview subjects.
The interviews conducted to support this research validate the existing
literature which states civilians are unresponsive to military requirements, civilian
continuity provides organizational history but causes civilian entrenchment, and
that civilians must be motivated differently than service members, but money is
their primary motivator. Service members also confirm the literature which
pronounces that civilians view schedules and time constraints differently than
service members.
Civilians interviewed confirmed existing literature which states that service
members do not treat civilians as members of the team and that the military culture
provides advantages for service members that are not available to civilians. Both
groups state that an effective and productive relationship between the two groups
is vital to support DoD.
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The majority of service members interviewed shared four major
assessments regarding civilians:
• civilians work on a time clock and are not as dedicated as service
members
• continuity provided by civilians is both good and bad for the
organization
• money is the primary motivator for civilians
• service members are better leaders that civilians
All military interviewees share the assumption that civilians are clock
watchers. Interviewees stated the civilian emphasis on time impedes the progress
and accomplishments of the organization. Interview subjects also expressed
frustration with the different treatment of the two groups with respect to official
travel during duty hours.
Military interviewees addressed the issue of civilian continuity in the
organization. Service members state that the continuity provided by civilians is
both beneficial and detrimental to an organization. A civilian's history and
knowledge of an organization benefits the short-tenured service member, yet the
tendency for civilians to stay in an organization for long periods of time may also
create a parochial civilian viewpoint and impede the progress of the team. In
addition, civilian tenure may result in a civilian waiting for a service member to
leave the organization if he (she) does not want to follow the service member's
instruction.
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Another area addressed by military interviewees is the motivation of
civilian employees. Many interview subjects stated that the prime motivator for
civilians is money. Some interview subjects cited pride in work performance as a
motive for civilians to perform. Other interview subjects stated that training was
not a motivator for civilians due to the on-going work requirements of civilians
and personal obligations.
The final assessment of military interviewees was that the military provides
better leadership than their civilian counterparts. Service members state that they
demonstrate leadership through the care they provide to employees and the
mentor-protege relationship which is fostered between military members.
Interviews conducted with civilians revealed four major areas of civilian
biases about the military.
• Military rotation has both positive and negative impact on an
organization.
• Military may place too much emphasis on their evaluations and may
neglect the job requirements.
• Military must adjust their management style for the DoD civilian
environment.
• The military culture and the different treatment of civilians and military
which results.
Civilians state that military rotation through an organization is both
beneficial and detrimental to an organization. Benefits can be gained from the
customer perspective and operational viewpoint contributed by service members,
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in addition to providing civilians exposure to and a greater understanding of the
military. Detriments noted by interview subjects are the disruption to the
organization due to the frequent personnel turnover and the consequent need to
"re-train" incoming military team members.
Another perception expressed by civilians interviewed is the emphasis that
the military place on their evaluations. While most interview subjects understand
the motivation behind this emphasis, they feel it forces service members to focus
only on those tasks which will impact their performance evaluations which are not
always the most beneficial to overall IPT goals. Interviewees also stated that the
performance evaluation, in concert with the short rotation of the military, forces
service members to adopt a short-term focus.
Civilian interview subjects expressed the view that a service member must
adjust to a civilian environment. Interview subjects state that successful military
leaders realize that a different leadership style is required and implement a team
based style which capitalizes on the civilian expertise in the organization.
Interview subjects stated that military officers would gain worthwhile experience
from earlier exposure to the civilian workforce.
Civilian interview subjects expressed a bias against the military culture and
the benefits it provides to its members. Civilians expressed resentment at the
immediate respect and credibility a service member receives compared to the lack
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of respect shown to a civilian employee of equal or higher position. Interviewees
also expressed frustration with the military clique and a civilian's inability to join
or benefit from it.
Both groups were asked what they felt the other group thought about them;
i.e., service members were asked what assumptions and attitudes civilians have
about service members; civilians were asked what assumptions and attitudes
service members have regarding civilians. It is interesting to note that the groups
repeated the attitudes and assumptions expressed by the other group, with few
exceptions. Civilians did not repeat the assumption that money was the prime
motivator for civilians, as the military interviewees stated and civilians did not
state that military are better leaders. Military officers did not view their rotation
and short tenure as a detriment to an organization.
Despite the numerous differences summarized here and cited in this
research, military and civilian interviewees claim that these attitudes have no
impact on IPT performance.
C. PREDICTIONS REGARDING THE SUCCESS OF AN IPT
COMPRISED OF SERVICE MEMBERS AND CIVILIANS
Subsidiary research question three asks "What can be predicted about the
success of the two groups working together in IPTs?" The literature recommends
effective teams: encourage active listening and constructive response to other team
members; have good interpersonal skills; give others the benefit of the doubt; and
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recognize the interests and achievements of others. Effective teams share
leadership roles; have individual and mutual accountability and collective work
products; discuss, decide and perform real work together; and hold open-ended
discussions and problem solving meetings. Good teams also have specific team
purposes that the team itself delivers and measures performance by assessing
collective work product (Katzenbach and Smith, 1993).
Given the above characteristics of effective teams, interviews with service
members and civilians indicate that these groups may have difficulty working
together in teams. The military management style (dictate and take charge) may
not facilitate communication or promote shared leadership roles but may force
team direction. There is the potential for both groups to feel that they are not
accepted as part of the team; the military "clique" may ostracize civilians and
transient nature of the military may exclude service members from local civilian
"cliques". The longevity of civilians in one job may present a parochial and
conservative employee viewpoint which may reduce the teams' effectiveness.
If team members are not motivated to accomplish the work of the team but
are motivated by other factors (individual salaries or performance evaluations), the
accomplishments of the team may be affected as team members are not assessed
based on collective work products. IPTs should acknowledge the achievements,
expertise and needs of group members while supporting collective work products.
100
In addition, IPTs should establish how schedules will be set and how work will be
accomplished. IPTs should also recognize the interests and achievements of team
members and use member expertise to accomplish team goals.
If IPTs avoid addressing issues of conflict, team performance may suffer.
Conflict management methods which surface issues when too little conflict is
present and constructively manage excessive conflict should be recognized as
useful IPT tools and implemented to enhance team performance.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MANAGING GROUP CONFLICT
The fourth and final subsidiary research question asks "Given the research,
how can diversity be managed to ensure team success?" The research cites
techniques to manage excessive conflict or raise conflict which is being avoided.
Conflict may need to be introduced to a group that ignores or avoids it by
providing training on its benefits and assurance that productive conflict will not be
punished. If excessive conflict is present in an IPT, conflict reduction techniques
include increased exposure to the other group, training and orientation, insuring
that the other group is accepted, and mentoring.
Increased contact with the other group may help decrease stereotypes.
Military and civilian interview subjects stated that both groups could benefit from
earlier and greater exposure to the other group. Interview subjects noted
differences between the educational and developmental opportunities for the
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groups; the elimination or reduction of this disparity may help reduce perceived
inequities that contribute to conflict and give both groups additional exposure to
each other's culture.
Training and orientation regarding the other group may help reduce biases.
Both groups could benefit from training which addresses the personnel, promotion
and cultural aspects of the other group. This training is not currently provided on
a formal basis to either group.
As stated in the interviews, mentoring is an aspect of the military culture
that civilians admire. The development of a mentor-protege program that crosses
the cultural boundaries may be beneficial to both groups. This would provide
exposure to members of the other group outside of the working environment,
where the majority of military-civilian interactions take place.
Both military and civilian should recognize that some degree of conflict
within the IPT is desirable. Interview subjects stated that while conflict may exist
between the groups, it is not dealt with, but ignored. As noted in the literature, too
much conflict may be counter-productive, yet insufficient conflict may inhibit
communications. A reasonable amount of conflict is desired for a team to
facilitate communication among team members and team success.
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E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
1. Analogous Research Conducted by a Service Member
Research was conducted by a Department of the Army civilian employee.
A valuable research endeavor may be conducted by a service member using the
same interview questions. Interview responses received by the service member
could be compared to those presented within this research document to determine
if biases and stereotypes cited by interview subjects are repeated. Research could
also be conducted by a civilian, employed by another branch of the Department of
Defense, to investigate if those groups have different assumptions and attitudes.
2. Conduct Survey on Biases and Stereotypes of Civilians and
Service Members
Valuable research could be conducted using a survey tool. Replies received
on the subject may be more objective due to the anonymous nature of a survey.
Although responses received from personal interviews may be more detailed,
surveys may offer a more honest assessment of the subject by survey respondents
and allow the use of broader samples to test the generalizability of these findings.
3. Conduct Research to Determine How Biases and Stereotypes Can
Be Reduced
Interviews and surveys to research how stereotypes and biases may be
reduced may benefit both groups by creating a more productive working
relationship. As stated in the research presented in this thesis, stereotypes leading
to potential intergroup conflict exist between the two groups. These areas of
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conflict predict some likely degradation in the effectiveness of IPTs. Further
research could target IPT member's recommendations of ways to reduce biases
and stereotypes. This can be done by identifying highly successful IPTs and
determining their strategies for identifying and managing the sources of conflict
that derive from these two distinct professional cultures.
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